What Makes INGO Advocacy Legitimate?

Posted on 25 May 2010

By Jennifer Rubenstein

This post is a response to the comments generated by Sherine Jayawickrama’s post on The Ethics of INGO Advocacy: Launching a Discussion. 

Thanks so much for the contributions so far—I’m learning a lot from the conversation!  This comment responds briefly to a theme that has come up in several posts: the relationship between justice and democracy under extremely “non-ideal” conditions.

Jay Goulden writes that, rather than the various possibilities I mention, perhaps we should view INGOs as “representatives of (global/their national) citizens concerned with issues of human rights, justice, etc.”  I think that, as a descriptive matter, this is exactly right: INGOs do often represent the views of their volunteers (and donors).  But I’m not sure if this entirely answers the question of what makes INGO advocacy legitimate or normatively acceptable. 

On the one hand, viewing INGOs as representatives of concerned citizens in wealthy countries helps to alleviate problems of insufficient accountability, because these citizens can hold INGOs accountable, at least to some degree.  This is attractive because, as Tosca Bruno-van Vijfeijken states, justice “can be a rather vague concept.”  But it does not change the fact that INGOs cannot avoid making significant substantive judgments about what is just and unjust, and about the best way to pursue justice. 

The idea that INGOs ought to represent citizens of wealthy countries who are concerned about human rights is compelling not for procedural reasons (e.g. because these citizens are under-represented).  Rather, it is compelling for substantive reasons: because—or, insofar as— their ideas about human rights and justice are good ideas.  In other words: by choosing to represent people who are already adequately represented at a procedural level, INGOs are—I would think—making a substantive judgment that their ideas about justice or human rights deserve a broader hearing.

Such judgments have consequences.  Michael Edwards argues that INGOs should be allowed to participate in debates about international development, but not directly shape policy outcomes: they should have “a voice not a vote.”   My worry about this proposal is that the distinction between a voice and a vote can be hazy, especially outside of formal representative institutions (as can the distinction between technical expertise and a vote, as Jay’s comment suggests). 

Like voting and technical expertise, speaking out about an issue is a form of power— especially in zero-sum contexts, where one actor’s speech leaves less room for others.  Limiting INGOs to exercising voice does not avoid the question of how they should wield that power.

It therefore seems to me that INGOs—even those that wish merely to act as megaphones for under-represented groups— must make substantive judgments about justice.  Denying this fact only obscures what INGO advocacy actually involves. 

All that INGOs can do, in the face of this tension between being democratic and promoting justice, is try to make their substantive decisions about justice as democratically as possible, and make their activities as representatives as conducive to justice as possible. 

I’m wondering what other people think: do INGOs face this tension (or something like it)?  If so, how should they deal with it?

Jennifer Rubenstein is Assistant Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia.