by Tony Pipa

Over 2,000 pages, 500 contributors, and 20 reports: The Center for U.S. Global Engagement recently released a “report of reports” summarizing the various calls to elevate global development in U.S. foreign policy and modernize U.S. foreign assistance.  Given the activity over the past two years, it is clear that the changes instituted by the new office of Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and the “F process” in the last administration did not satisfy the development community.

If volume is any indication, political momentum for more fundamental change was reaching a tipping point, and indeed the Obama campaign pledged to double foreign assistance in ten years and streamline the various and fragmented funding mechanisms into one agency.  All that was before the advent of the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression.

The new administration has yet to officially announce nominations for senior posts such as USAID administrator or put forward a blueprint for change.  While the commitment to elevating development as a strategic priority still seems apparent – witness Secretary of State Clinton’s public remarks and the president’s budget, which proposes a 9.5% increase for international affairs - the devil, as they say, is in the details.  The delay is raising concern, especially since differences remain about which structures and next steps provide the best chance, in practice rather than rhetoric, for making development the equal of defense and diplomacy, especially when decisions about resources are on the table.*

Is the best route to create a cabinet-level department or expand development’s influence from within the State Department – or something else?  There seems to be consensus about creating the first-ever government-wide strategy for global development, but should that be stand-alone or integrated with the national security strategy?  How high a priority should it be to rewrite and update the Foreign Assistance Act?

As the politics around these questions play out, it is important not to lose sight of the larger goals that provided the original impetus for reform.  Colin Powell’s comment during the USCGE release event that he preferred the term “smart influence” to “smart power” was a welcome re-grounding in the notion that human and community development is something we promote, support, help grow – not something we wield.  While the practice of defense and diplomacy are fundamentally inseparable from the national interest, development has a larger humane purpose - that, when done well, serves the national interest, and sometimes in ways more valuable than the other two.

Also, as I’ve mentioned before, development’s effectiveness should not solely be equated with measurable, tangible results on identifiable individuals.  While that can improve political palatability, successful long-term development encompasses building the capacity of local leadership and governance structures; it’s sometimes messy and non-linear.

NGOs have much to offer as the government seeks to improve its effectiveness in reducing global poverty and providing assistance to those in crisis.  While now NGOs often play the role of contractors and implementers, their breadth of experience makes them well-positioned to be “thought partners” as the government shifts its approach and re-calibrates its structure.

Their own struggles to measure and articulate strategic impact may prove exceptionally useful.  They also sit at the nexus of the rapidly increasing private resources being deployed toward international causes, and could provide ways to increase leverage.

Such a role might mean being less focused on their own needs.  Expanding the pool of unrestricted resources, for example, could improve the impact of a reinvigorated USAID or a new development agency;  this also might mean reduced earmarks or moving funds into accounts that make NGOs less certain of receiving them.  This could be a tough sell in today’s economic environment, which is causing havoc to NGO budgets.

But as Marty Linsky has posed the question, “Will you reset or hunker down?” His point: this crisis, rather than being a one-time event, could be a permanent shift that requires examining all our assumptions.  It might be just the thing to take us past the tipping point and inspire significant change.  That would be good news, not only for U.S. foreign policy, but for those around the world living in extreme poverty.

* The 2006 National Security Strategy identifies development assistance, diplomacy, and defense as the three pillars of security.