Humanitarian and International Development NGOs

So, questions still remain about the ability of the U.S. disaster relief system to handle a large-scale catastrophe.  What can we do?

(1) Develop a national disaster relief fund

With such a fund, private contributions for relief and recovery would be collected and distributed by an independent entity, with independent oversight, whose sole purpose is to find and support the organizations - local or national, small or large - that are responding most effectively in a specific disaster.  My preference would be to have all response agencies, including the American Red Cross and the national VOAD agencies, commit to and benefit from such a fund.  This means that the national agencies would throw their support behind a collective fund raising effort after a disaster, similar to the joint appeals by international NGOs that are so successful in other countries, rather than undertaking their own individual campaigns.  This could:

• Improve response by allowing organizations during the height of the crisis to focus on providing services rather than raising funds
• Reduce administrative costs significantly within the field by streamlining fund raising
• Create a single, recognizable brand that simplifies donor decisions and offers an attractive partnership opportunity for media outlets, celebrities, and corporations while acknowledging that effective response requires supporting a diversity of nonprofits and faith-based groups.

Let’s be real - the bulk of the money from such a fund would likely still go to large, national organizations.  However, it would improve immeasurably the access that local organizations have to small private contributions, and if done correctly, should also significantly improve accountability.  If such a fund built a successful track record, I can envision it developing the reach and credibility to raise funds successfully between disasters to ensure an adequate reserve and fund preparedness programs (see #2…).

(2) Stimulate and support local, integrated disaster preparedness programs

Federal funding for disaster preparedness has been in steady decline at a time when we need it most.  Such programs should be expanded; should be focused at the local level; and should ensure that local nonprofits, faith-based groups, and the private sector are at the table when plans are created.

It’s time to resurrect  programs like Project Impact, which brought local nonprofits and businesses alongside government to develop and implement mitigation strategies.  Project Impact was widely credited with keeping damage and casualties to a minimum after the Seattle earthquake in 2001 that measured 6.8 on the Richter scale, yet was cut the same exact day by the president to save $25 million, a tiny percentage of FEMA’s base budget.

It’s time to perfect and take to scale programs like Operation Brother’s Keeper, a partnership between inner-city African-American churches and the New Orleans chapter of the American Red Cross meant to ensure that vulnerable community members were included in relief efforts during a major disaster.  Unfortunately the partnership  was in the early planning stages when Katrina hit.

We need hundreds of local, self-directed efforts like the promising multi-sector effort in San Francisco -  BayPrep - with the leadership of the mayor’s office behind it, and like the local VOADs - coalitions of local nonprofits and faith groups in dialogue with local emergency officials - that have sprung up in Louisiana through the leadership of the Louisiana Association of Nonprofit Organizations, the United Way, and others. Concerted funding and effort by FEMA and key national nonprofits could go a long way toward stimulating robust and essential disaster preparedness at the local level.

(3) Develop a high-tech, quick-strike coordination capability to take in and report out essential information in real time to responding agencies

Current systems of organizing and presenting information are not accessible nor usable by the multitude of nonprofits that might be involved in a large scale response.  The system currently in place does not easily allow a wide array of nonprofits to feed in information about their needs assessments and services, so it’s difficult for other organizations to understand where they may be best used to fill the gaps.  We need to create a system that assumes that many diverse organizations will be involved, and can systematically organize information gathering and sharing of a decentralized response. Responding organizations should be able to get real-time answers to the fundamental question “What is needed by whom where?”

For FEMA to play the primary role in developing and implementing such a system, it will have to radically improve its understanding of the broad nonprofit sector and elevate its senior nonprofit liaisons to a much higher level of authority.

(4) Review and reform the Stafford Act

We need to make sure that our legislation works well to cover and handle the increased amount of emergency events that we are sure to face; that we have a clear sense of the extent of our government’s commitment to supporting people in their relief and recovery; and that budgeting processes are structured in a way that minimizes politicization.

To undertake any or all of these will require the leadership of the dominant players - FEMA, the American Red Cross, and the national VOAD agencies - and the input of local organizations and governments that have experienced some of our recent major disasters.  It will require a shift away from promoting their individual organizations and “becoming fund raising machines” to thinking about what is best for the field and what would make U.S. disaster relief as effective as possible.  Then perhaps we’ll truly learn the lessons that Katrina, Ike, and Gustav have so harshly offered.

Regarding mechanisms to raise and distribute funds in the wake of emergencies, it might be productive to revisit lessons from my experience with hurricane Katrina.  I arrived in Louisiana 10 days after the storm and helped found the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation.

As documented in reports like my Weathering the Storm: the Role of Local Nonprofits in the Hurricane Katrina Relief Effort (Aspen Institute) and the Urban Institute’s Open & Operating? An Assessment of Louisiana Nonprofit Health and Human Services after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, local nonprofits and faith-based groups filled large gaps during the relief phase, yet had great difficulty accessing funds to pay for their efforts.  This despite what was by most measures the largest philanthropic response in U.S. history, ultimately over $3.5 billion, as tracked by the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University.  

One reason is that many of the responding organizations were never before involved in disaster relief – they were trusted local groups that recognized the need and jumped in.  They had little capacity to make themselves known to a national audience, especially while providing additional services in a fast-evolving and compromised environment.

International relief NGOs were among the most successful in distributing their resources quickly to groups on the ground, even though many of these NGOs were responding to a U.S. emergency for the first time.  They deployed staff to the area and used their experience, earned in international settings, to infiltrate local networks.  Some remained beyond the relief phase: Mercy Corps’s program operated past a couple of years, for example, and Oxfam America has made a long-term commitment, with a robust staff still in the region (disclaimer: I authored a report for Oxfam at the one-year anniversary regarding the recovery status of low-income communities).

It should be noted that the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund, which raised the bulk of its almost $130 million in the early days of the disaster, did not distribute its first grants until December 7, 2005, more than three months after Katrina hit.  I would venture that it’s not exactly what many small donors had in mind when they contributed, hoping to relieve the immediate suffering they were witnessing on TV. 

A large block of those first grants were channeled to state funds created specifically for Katrina relief, and Mississippi’s state fund had still not used any of its $17 million ($12.4 million from the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund) by September 2006, fully one year after Katrina.

Rather than act as a pass-through to organizations already at work, similar to what they did with funds raised for the 2004 tsunami, the former presidents created a new organization - with its own staff - to handle the distribution of the money, much like a traditional foundation.  Part of the motivation stemmed from concerns about accountability and the desire to track the use of the funds more closely.  But even a determined and well-resourced start-up could not get up to speed to be relevant during the relief phase, though it lasted 10 times longer than the norm for a big catastrophe.

The positive side is that those funds were available as relief moved to recovery and reconstruction.  While the bulk of donations by the public invariably occurs immediately after an emergency, a significant portion of resources are needed over a long period of time as communities slowly rebuild.  This is another aspect that recommends the joint appeal model discussed in the previous post.  Such an appeal has the potential not only to collect and deploy donations quickly, but may also have more leeway from the public to meter their uses throughout the different phases of recovery.   

The effort to provide relief to survivors of the Myanmar cyclone and the Chinese earthquake resurfaces questions of how to effectively mobilize and deploy charitable contributions in an international emergency. People across the U.S. interested in making contributions want to know that their gifts, large or small, are being put to good use. And as Lucy Bernholz points out in this post to her blog, Philanthropy 2173, media companies like Google are beginning to make recommendations about which organizations to support, raising questions about accountability and potential conflicts of interest.

Many European countries and others like Japan, Australia, and Canada have what are termed “joint appeals,” which promote one unified fundraising campaign for a particular emergency and then share the proceeds among a consortium of organizations. A donor makes a contribution to one place, secure in the knowledge that she is supporting organizations with the capacity to respond effectively and that those organizations are cooperating – not competing – for gifts.  The donor can be confident that her gift will be deployed fairly, in accord with pre-agreed criteria.  For the donor, the focus is on efficiency rather than choice.

The Disasters Emergency Committee in the UK is the oldest and arguably most successful of the joint appeals. Through significant partnerships with the BBC, ITV, and British Telecom, the DEC has become a known and trusted brand in the UK. It has raised approximately $750 million since 2004 just for the southeast Asia tsunami.

There have been serious conversations within the NGO community about creating something similar in the U.S., but the challenges are compounded by the larger number of NGOs that provide international relief and our fragmented media market. Most joint appeals consist of no more than a dozen organizations, making it reasonable to manage governance and fund allocations.  The mechanics and politics of who’s in, who’s out, by what standards, and how to share the money get complicated when 30-40 organizations might stake a reasonable claim.

Most joint appeals also have one or two media companies that provide instant access to the majority of their public. In the U.S., four (five?) national networks and myriad cable channels make it difficult to line up enough media support to ensure it would be value-added – and that’s just television.

There is no hard research that shows U.S. donors would give up choice to reward cooperation and efficiency in a crisis situation, though the Bush-Clinton fund raising in the wake of hurricane Katrina (more on that in the next post) seems to support the notion. But it’s an attractive proposition to have a centralized mechanism, with high levels of transparency and accountability for the use of funds and with the capacity to distribute the money quickly to organizations with the capacity and reach to provide relief effectively. This would seem advantageous to having multiple companies like Google choose and promote their own recommendations, which – while providing a bit more direction – doesn’t necessarily make donors’ choices easier, especially if different companies are recommending different organizations.

NGOs have been working to coordinate the delivery of their services on the ground and develop best practices through efforts like the Emergency Capacity-Building Project. Working together on fund raising would bring them together on the other side of the proverbial “coin.”