Over 2,000 pages, 500 contributors, and 20 reports: The Center for U.S. Global Engagement recently released a “report of reports” summarizing the various calls to elevate global development in U.S. foreign policy and modernize U.S. foreign assistance.  Given the activity over the past two years, it is clear that the changes instituted by the new office of Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and the “F process” in the last administration did not satisfy the development community.

If volume is any indication, political momentum for more fundamental change was reaching a tipping point, and indeed the Obama campaign pledged to double foreign assistance in ten years and streamline the various and fragmented funding mechanisms into one agency.  All that was before the advent of the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression.

The new administration has yet to officially announce nominations for senior posts such as USAID administrator or put forward a blueprint for change.  While the commitment to elevating development as a strategic priority still seems apparent – witness Secretary of State Clinton’s public remarks and the president’s budget, which proposes a 9.5% increase for international affairs – the devil, as they say, is in the details.  The delay is raising concern, especially since differences remain about which structures and next steps provide the best chance, in practice rather than rhetoric, for making development the equal of defense and diplomacy, especially when decisions about resources are on the table.*

Is the best route to create a cabinet-level department or expand development’s influence from within the State Department – or something else?  There seems to be consensus about creating the first-ever government-wide strategy for global development, but should that be stand-alone or integrated with the national security strategy?  How high a priority should it be to rewrite and update the Foreign Assistance Act?

As the politics around these questions play out, it is important not to lose sight of the larger goals that provided the original impetus for reform.  Colin Powell’s comment during the USCGE release event that he preferred the term “smart influence” to “smart power” was a welcome re-grounding in the notion that human and community development is something we promote, support, help grow – not something we wield.  While the practice of defense and diplomacy are fundamentally inseparable from the national interest, development has a larger humane purpose – that, when done well, serves the national interest, and sometimes in ways more valuable than the other two.

Also, as I’ve mentioned before, development’s effectiveness should not solely be equated with measurable, tangible results on identifiable individuals.  While that can improve political palatability, successful long-term development encompasses building the capacity of local leadership and governance structures; it’s sometimes messy and non-linear.

NGOs have much to offer as the government seeks to improve its effectiveness in reducing global poverty and providing assistance to those in crisis.  While now NGOs often play the role of contractors and implementers, their breadth of experience makes them well-positioned to be “thought partners” as the government shifts its approach and re-calibrates its structure.

Their own struggles to measure and articulate strategic impact may prove exceptionally useful.  They also sit at the nexus of the rapidly increasing private resources being deployed toward international causes, and could provide ways to increase leverage.

Such a role might mean being less focused on their own needs.  Expanding the pool of unrestricted resources, for example, could improve the impact of a reinvigorated USAID or a new development agency;  this also might mean reduced earmarks or moving funds into accounts that make NGOs less certain of receiving them.  This could be a tough sell in today’s economic environment, which is causing havoc to NGO budgets.

But as Marty Linsky has posed the question, “Will you reset or hunker down?” His point: this crisis, rather than being a one-time event, could be a permanent shift that requires examining all our assumptions.  It might be just the thing to take us past the tipping point and inspire significant change.  That would be good news, not only for U.S. foreign policy, but for those around the world living in extreme poverty.

* The 2006 National Security Strategy identifies development assistance, diplomacy, and defense as the three pillars of security.

I know Sherine will offer a perspective that’s provocative, thoughtful, and grounded in reality.  I look forward to her analysis and to joining the dialogue alongside the rest of you – and posting guest commentary occasionally!

Since it’s my final official post, I’m taking the prerogative to end with a personal story.  During the holidays I took a friend visiting from Australia to see Over the Rhine (OTR), one of Cincinnati’s best-loved bands (I live in Cincy and have been tele-commuting for my work at Harvard).  OTR’s holiday show at the Taft Theatre is a local tradition and not to be missed.

Between sets, a volunteer approached and asked if we’d like to sponsor a child through World Vision.  Not something I expect at a rock concert.  I already do so, as a Christmas gift for some nieces and nephews – they get the letters and information about the child.  I figured it was a good way for them to make a friend and learn about a new place, and if it sparked some compassion, all the better.

The second surprise came when Kieran responded that he sponsored a child too.  We hadn’t seen each other in 17 years, since playing the minor leagues of professional tennis in France.  He’s a playwright and lyricist now, and the artist’s life hasn’t been particularly lucrative, but he is committed to being a good global citizen.

Toward the end of the show, Linford Detweiler, who with his wife leads OTR, waded into a story about the death of his father earlier in the year.  On March 15, during the band’s load-out in Birmingham, he received a call with the unexpected news.  As he tried to deal with the loss, he decided to sponsor a child born on March 15.  It brought a certain measure of closure and redemption, and the band committed itself to signing up new sponsors for World Vision at each concert.

I was struck by the connectedness of it all.  We spanned four continents among us (including the children being sponsored), and through one organization we were finding a way to serve each other.   Amidst the analysis and theoretical frames and dialogues about strategic challenges, it was nice to be reminded that, at a basic level, these enterprises help us acknowledge and give meaning to our common humanity – help us do for each other what we can – despite distance, cultural and economic differences, and political boundaries.  That’s why they’re important.  They’re models of a twenty-first century community, these NGOs.  That’s why it’s important we get them right.

I’ve enjoyed sharing my thoughts and analysis over the past year, and I look forward to following where Sherine and you take this dialogue next.  Thanks.

This is a case study unfolding in real time.  While Kjerstin’s move provides an unusual learning opportunity for those interested in nonprofit effectiveness and sustainability, it also offers a chance to reflect on the many “facets” of nonprofit transparency.

(1) During my time as funder, several organizations came to us in crisis, laid open their books and spoke plainly about the decisions and mistakes that got them there.  In this respect, I don’t find the honesty with which Kjerstin is presenting her dilemma all that unusual.

Crisis can inspire transparency.  It’s hard to get the injection of cash or technical assistance you need by trying to mask the fact that you need it.

Most of these organizations already had a relationship with us, and trusted us enough to discuss their problems openly.  They were not going to tell just anybody about their state of affairs.

What is unusual is that FORGE is fairly well-established, yet Kjerstin is using online social networking tools to let everybody know about her plight.  She has attracted great resources, partly due to the “buzz” created by her initial posts and her courageousness in being so open.  But I suspect if it became standard practice for nonprofit leaders to post honest and detailed information about looming financial crises, the novelty would wear off  – and subsequent leaders would have a hard time getting the same sort of attention.  Which brings up the question – what kind of transparency are we after?

(2) The discussion in the blogosphere centers on the benefits of transparency for donors and, as a learning opportunity, other nonprofit leaders and allies.  But nonprofits derive their legitimacy from the constituents and the communities they serve.  Shouldn’t transparency also serve them?  To what level?

And it’s a two-way street – if I were a prospective donor, I’m interested in what the refugees served by FORGE think (if they know the program is in jeopardy of closing and have some understanding of the decisions that led there yet still choose to participate in the program, that’s important to me).  Caveat: I discount the information somewhat if FORGE is the source of the refugees’ voices, since those voices are being filtered through an interested party.

(3) Filters can degrade transparency.  We’ve heard about FORGE’s history and decisions almost exclusively from Kjerstin, so we’re getting mainly one perspective (not sure that meets the definition of “radical transparency“).  Does better transparency include accessibility to, and information directly from, all parts of the organization?

During my time in NC, the Golden LEAF foundation, funded from the proceeds of the tobacco settlement, held their grantmaking meetings in public (they may still).  As a prospective grantee, you could attend and watch as your proposal was discussed and decided.

This example highlights different levels of transparency regarding board decisions: we can get a summary from the chief executive; have access to a copy of the minutes; or be able to listen to the board meeting itself.  I probably learn the most if I listen, but can I really do this for each organization that interests me?

Filters might degrade transparency, but they can also make information useful.

(4) Do we want different levels of transparency for different phases of an organization’s evolution?  A venture capitalist investing in an early-stage company, for example, may expect a seat on the board – not only for control, but to have the fullest possible information about internal operations.  After the company goes public, however, the standards of transparency for new outside investors don’t presume such access.

This also brings up the question of size, both of potential investment and the organization itself.  Are large-scale investors entitled to more information than small donors (they might reasonably expect a more direct relationship, but are they entitled to a different level of information?)?

How should our standards serve both the International Rescue Committee, which in 2006 served 15 million refugees in 25 countries with a budget close to $250 million, and FORGE, which serves refugees with a budget approaching $400,000 – and is there a way to design those standards so that the refugee programs for the two can easily be compared?     I’d love to see an organizational prospectus that meets the informational needs of all interested parties: the government/IRS, institutional investors (i.e., foundations and high-wealth donors), everyday contributors, and constituents.

(5) I think it’s important to recognize that FORGE is practicing transparency from a relatively privileged position.  As Kretzmann and McKnight – who pioneered the asset-based approach to community building – would point out, Kjerstin has a strong base of intellectual and social capital and access to a range of additional resources (evidenced by the amount of support she’s already attracted).

As an organization accrues an increasing amount of “assets” – not just financial, but intellectual, social, and reputational – the instinct is to become increasingly guarded, since more seems at risk.  The counter-intuitive nature of Kjerstin’s move is one reason why it has elicited so much attention.  I have experienced nonprofit leaders in marginalized communities, for example, who are brutally honest and open about most details of their organizations (mistakes included), but their transparency doesn’t get them much.  Often such “assets” are used by those with potentially helpful resources as a proxy for effectiveness (or at least potential effectiveness), and those that seem lacking are too easily dismissed.

If funders are honest, we’ll admit that getting too full a story is sometimes a turn-off; we think it shows poor lack of judgment.  Presentation is still important, even when being open.

(6) It’s easy to be glib about “weeding out” the sector, to say that some nonprofits need to close.  FORGE’s dilemma demonstrates that the reality is complicated.  Refugees would go unserved. (When I hear conference presenters say donors should throw their support behind a well-run homeless shelter that serves 20 people (and has no aspirations to serve more), and stay away from another that serves 200 but where the management is more suspect – that it should be allowed to fail – I always wonder what the 200 people suddenly out on the street would say.)  This would occur due to what appears to be a well-intended error in judgment vs. a pattern of bad management.

Yes, some nonprofits should cease to exist, but I don’t trust that at this point, through whatever weeding out processes are occurring – given the fragmented and imperfect nature of the nonprofit capital market, the difficulty of assessing and articulating impact, and our personal biases and predilections – we’ll end up with the organizations providing the most effective services, or that those who might benefit most would get served.  We ought to be careful what we wish for – and wish FORGE well.

Lant used a metaphor of NGOs as scaffolding – a temporary structure to relieve an immediate burden of a developing community, as well as a resource to build the wall necessary to hold the burden over the long term.  Problem is, often the wall never gets built, and after a while the scaffolding is dismantled and it’s on to the next project.

I cited examples in my initial post to highlight that this is not always the case.  However, I do agree that NGOs can do a much better job of developing strategies – from the very beginning of a project – to ensure that their intention of transitioning a program or services to local government or authority comes to pass.  There is a need to document and share learning about such efforts, and deepen our understanding about what makes them successes or failures.

Martha Chen of the Hauser Center, who coordinates WIEGO, also offered the example of Bangladesh, where NGOs – BRAC in particular – have essentially created and run an educational system in light of the government’s failure to provide this basic service.  While the intent was to provide education until the government assumed responsibility, there seems to be no end in sight, even after close to 20 years.  She raised the possibility of a hybrid, where the NGO takes over permanent authority and responsibility for what we generally consider a state-provided social service.  Could this work?  What would be the implications?

In Duncan’s thesis, a key element in the relationship between active citizens and effective states is taxation.  As he notes in the book, “until governments depend on their publics for their wages, it will always be an uphill struggle to force them to listen.”

Aid distorts taxation.  When a government receives 60% of its revenue from foreign aid (as, Duncan explained, Uganda did until recently), their leadership is going to spend far more time interacting with donors than their own citizens.  Devising a way to provide aid that insists on creating indigenous capacity so that ultimately aid is unnecessary is a conundrum akin to devising a successful U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, with attendant political dynamics and risk to stability.  Perhaps the first step – as in the much-debated military strategy – is making clear that an exit is going to happen, and sticking to it.

Some quick reflections:

Duncan’s thesis is that development is best achieved through (1) active citizenship and (2) effective states.  While instinctively we might place these two in opposition to each other, they can be compatible and complementary.  To be successful in alleviating poverty, the two must combine to redistribute power within markets so that poor people benefit:

The impact of markets on poverty and inequality depends on whether poor people can exert influence over the way they operate.

Working from his thesis, Duncan offered the following pressing issues for NGOs (this is my interpretation):

• Inequality vs. poverty.  NGOs should focus on inequality, which puts their focus on the imbalance of power that leads to poverty, and forces them out of the mindset that poverty is just about lack of income or assets.
• Religious blind spot.  Whereas most NGOs focus on secular policy, much development takes place through faith communities and the influence they hold on people’s lives.
• Focus on urban areas.  NGOs suffer from “peasant romanticism,” focusing efforts on rural villages and communities, when most poor people are now found in urban areas.
• Making states effective.  NGOs may be too small to have much influence on states and make them effective (which begs the question – then who?).
• Migration.  The NGO community is mostly missing on the question of making migration a humane, dignified experience.  They have yet to take a stand in the hot political environment.
• Accountability.  NGOs are often less accountable then the actors and institutions that they accuse of suffering from a lack of accountability.
• Emergencies vs. long-term development.  Emergencies – whether complex political emergencies or natural disasters – are “shocks” that offer significant opportunity for systemic change.  Yet during the brief opening in the aftermath of crisis, NGOs focus on providing and restoring services – putting on the ground experts in providing relief – rather than bringing in the expertise – the economists, the policy analysts and developers – to effect structural changes that lead to successful long-term development.  Time to turn that on its head.
• New global institutions.  This moment of global financial crisis may be one of the few real opportunities to create new global institutions capable of regulating and redistributing power.  Otherwise such processes typically experience enormous resistance and are agonizingly slow.
• Overselling globalization.  Most development remains at the national level.  NGOs may be focusing too much energy and advocacy on international campaigns.
• Understanding change.  NGOs need better models for understanding how change occurs and being able to track progress.

Much food for thought.  I was especially struck by the point that the aftermath of emergencies is an  opportunity to advance social change.  It rang true – the social and government structures are so often unsettled, and those in charge more willing to incorporate new ideas and policies, especially if such policies reduce the vulnerability that the crisis has brought into such relief.   NGOs might make relatively easy changes to their approach and have great impact doing so.

I’m sorry we didn’t get to explore the question of accountability more deeply.  How are NGOs less accountable than they purport?

What jumps out at you?

It is a truth almost universally acknowledged, at least by NGO leaders and international development policy experts, that U.S. foreign assistance is badly in need of modernizing and restructuring.   One reason is  excessive fragmentation: aid is distributed by the federal government out of 20 different agencies and 50 different offices.  As critics like to point out, this does not make for policy coherence.

There are myriad factors for this jumble, chief among them the steady disinvestment in USAID over the past two decades.  But there’s another reason that deserves more attention, since it reflects a similar trend among major private foundations and donors: the desire to measure and demonstrate impact.

As three past administrators of USAID point out in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, the focus of many newer presidential initiatives or earmarks is narrowly defined on a particular issue, which is “politically appealing because they appear to have a direct, measurable impact on identifiable individuals.”  Here’s the problem: “… such a concentration on the short-term delivery of goods and services comes at the expense of building sustainable institutions that promote long-term development.”

It’s not enough to make drugs available to treat AIDS in a developing country.  To solve the problem requires a public infrastructure – education and training for clinicians, effective government agencies, appropriate public health education, sustained services – as well as a healthy civil society that will make the drugs less and less necessary by improving the overall health and stability of the affected community.

The current craze in philanthropy for assessing and quantifying impact presents a similar conundrum.   Focusing too closely on individual trees – because it’s easier to count the leaves – makes one run the risk of missing the forest altogether.  As Susan Berresford, former president of the Ford Foundation, remarked over a year ago, “Isn’t it possible that too much reliance on short-term plans can miniaturize ambition for justice and for progress on deeply entrenched problems such as racism, poverty and inequality?”

If the federal government were to develop a comprehensive U.S. development strategy, it could help – at least then the burden can shift to measuring progress on the broad aims of development in toto.  As most community organizers will tell you, rights-based development requires sustained, comprehensive investments in people and communities, and processes for developing local capacity and reforming social structures are messy and non-linear.  A commitment to improving human security – which a new Obama adminstration has put forward as an important element of its  approach to U.S. global engagement – requires a willingness to accept that some crucial elements of progress might be unquantifiable.  The political appeal of short-term results will have to give way to a more complicated, nuanced picture – and that would buck the prevailing winds in the sector.

Sam’s statistics were stark.  In 2000, the revenues of the U.S. NGO community working to reduce global poverty were approximately $4 billion.  About 50% of that funding came from government, 50% from private contributors.  In 2006, revenues had grown to $8.8 billion – but $6 billion came from private resources.  The $800 million increase in government funding was dwarfed by a $4 billion increase in private funds, and the balance was suddenly close to 70% private and 30% public.

On the surface, such a trend might seem liberating to NGOs, offering the space to be more creative and take greater risks in their mission to serve the poorest people in developing countries.  Federal funding is intended to serve the national interest, and it carries constraints.  Early versions of the strategic realignment of U.S. foreign assistance, which brought the Director of Foreign Assistance under the auspices of the State Department, did not even include the word “poverty.” It is challenging for NGOs to stay true to a development mission using U.S. funds when all other interests appear to trump it.

Yet it matters just how that $6 billion in private money is comprised.  Major philanthropists and foundations, the kind that participate in the Global Philanthropy Forum or the Clinton Global Initiative, for example, often impose their own constraints in pursuit of strategic impact.  There have been too many times in the recent quest for innovation that donors have created large projects without taking advantage of the development expertise hard-earned by NGOs through three decades of trial and error.

Whereas before NGOs could voice their views to one entity – the U.S. government – and know that they were  attempting to influence a major segment of their market, suddenly they are faced with educating and negotiating with a multitude of actors, all with their own individual agendas.

As Sam Worthington noted in our discussion, unrestricted money best provides NGOs the freedom to act on their own knowledge and inclinations.  Paradoxically, those NGOs where countless small donors make up the largest slice of revenue are likely to feel freest to pursue their agendas on their own terms – and may result in more innovation and more empowering relationships with local communities than otherwise.  Foundations and philanthropists who believe that NGOs, left to their own devices, are effective at developing successful strategies to reduce poverty would do well to build a percentage of unrestricted funding into every grant.

This is important for a bottom-up approach to development.  Helping local communities and individuals find their own voice and build their own leadership often brings change at the deepest level, but it is not linear, and progress along the way is often hard to measure.  To be successful requires long-term commitments (from 10-20 years) with money that allows strategies to be flexible and priorities to be adaptable.

Some critics* contend that the ties between large Northern NGOs and their host countries have grown too close and diluted the NGOs’ ability to offer approaches that differ significantly from their country’s aid program.  It’s not clear that the increasing share of private funds within foreign aid, while significant, will offer much respite.

* From Can NGOs Make a Difference?  The Challenges of Development Alternatives: “There are serious doubts regarding how far NGOs in the North are able to do anything that is especially alternative to their host countries’ bilateral aid programmes.”

(1) Develop a national disaster relief fund

With such a fund, private contributions for relief and recovery would be collected and distributed by an independent entity, with independent oversight, whose sole purpose is to find and support the organizations – local or national, small or large – that are responding most effectively in a specific disaster.  My preference would be to have all response agencies, including the American Red Cross and the national VOAD agencies, commit to and benefit from such a fund.  This means that the national agencies would throw their support behind a collective fund raising effort after a disaster, similar to the joint appeals by international NGOs that are so successful in other countries, rather than undertaking their own individual campaigns.  This could:

• Improve response by allowing organizations during the height of the crisis to focus on providing services rather than raising funds
• Reduce administrative costs significantly within the field by streamlining fund raising
• Create a single, recognizable brand that simplifies donor decisions and offers an attractive partnership opportunity for media outlets, celebrities, and corporations while acknowledging that effective response requires supporting a diversity of nonprofits and faith-based groups.

Let’s be real – the bulk of the money from such a fund would likely still go to large, national organizations.  However, it would improve immeasurably the access that local organizations have to small private contributions, and if done correctly, should also significantly improve accountability.  If such a fund built a successful track record, I can envision it developing the reach and credibility to raise funds successfully between disasters to ensure an adequate reserve and fund preparedness programs (see #2…).

(2) Stimulate and support local, integrated disaster preparedness programs

Federal funding for disaster preparedness has been in steady decline at a time when we need it most.  Such programs should be expanded; should be focused at the local level; and should ensure that local nonprofits, faith-based groups, and the private sector are at the table when plans are created.

It’s time to resurrect  programs like Project Impact, which brought local nonprofits and businesses alongside government to develop and implement mitigation strategies.  Project Impact was widely credited with keeping damage and casualties to a minimum after the Seattle earthquake in 2001 that measured 6.8 on the Richter scale, yet was cut the same exact day by the president to save $25 million, a tiny percentage of FEMA’s base budget.

It’s time to perfect and take to scale programs like Operation Brother’s Keeper, a partnership between inner-city African-American churches and the New Orleans chapter of the American Red Cross meant to ensure that vulnerable community members were included in relief efforts during a major disaster.  Unfortunately the partnership  was in the early planning stages when Katrina hit.

We need hundreds of local, self-directed efforts like the promising multi-sector effort in San Francisco -  BayPrep – with the leadership of the mayor’s office behind it, and like the local VOADs – coalitions of local nonprofits and faith groups in dialogue with local emergency officials – that have sprung up in Louisiana through the leadership of the Louisiana Association of Nonprofit Organizations, the United Way, and others. Concerted funding and effort by FEMA and key national nonprofits could go a long way toward stimulating robust and essential disaster preparedness at the local level.

(3) Develop a high-tech, quick-strike coordination capability to take in and report out essential information in real time to responding agencies

Current systems of organizing and presenting information are not accessible nor usable by the multitude of nonprofits that might be involved in a large scale response.  The system currently in place does not easily allow a wide array of nonprofits to feed in information about their needs assessments and services, so it’s difficult for other organizations to understand where they may be best used to fill the gaps.  We need to create a system that assumes that many diverse organizations will be involved, and can systematically organize information gathering and sharing of a decentralized response. Responding organizations should be able to get real-time answers to the fundamental question “What is needed by whom where?”

For FEMA to play the primary role in developing and implementing such a system, it will have to radically improve its understanding of the broad nonprofit sector and elevate its senior nonprofit liaisons to a much higher level of authority.

(4) Review and reform the Stafford Act

We need to make sure that our legislation works well to cover and handle the increased amount of emergency events that we are sure to face; that we have a clear sense of the extent of our government’s commitment to supporting people in their relief and recovery; and that budgeting processes are structured in a way that minimizes politicization.

To undertake any or all of these will require the leadership of the dominant players – FEMA, the American Red Cross, and the national VOAD agencies – and the input of local organizations and governments that have experienced some of our recent major disasters.  It will require a shift away from promoting their individual organizations and “becoming fund raising machines” to thinking about what is best for the field and what would make U.S. disaster relief as effective as possible.  Then perhaps we’ll truly learn the lessons that Katrina, Ike, and Gustav have so harshly offered.

In my absence, events continued to raise questions about the capability of the U.S. disaster response system. There were criticisms of the response to Hurricane Ike, a report from the GAO that the American Red Cross and other leading nonprofits lack the capacity for a major emergency, and the American Red Cross just received $100 million from Congress to replenish funds for disaster relief.

U.S. disaster response is officially a public-private partnership.  It is one of the few instances in which the government officially designates nonprofits to provide support (see the National Response Framework).  The lead governmental agency – FEMA – is given authority to coordinate non-governmental groups.

Some major weaknesses that I perceive:

(1) I do not believe there is clarity between what our government views as its responsibility and what it considers the purview of private donations to nonprofits and faith-based groups. The Stafford Act gives permission for the federal government to fund everything from temporary shelter and cash grants to legal aid, food supplies, and home repair.  But to whom and to what point?   Is the government primarily focused on helping those who have the least resources to support their own recovery, or on everyone – rich or poor – who was affected?  Is it their goal to support survivors until they’re able to return to their homes and start clean-up, or get them back to their level of pre-storm living?

The way the Act is structured, federal funding is negotiated on a case-by-case basis with the affected state after each emergency.  The government clearly sees itself as the primary supporter of the repair of damaged infrastructure.  “People” issues, however, seem to get revisited each time.  The danger is that those decisions can become politicized, especially since the funding is budgeted outside the annual appropriations process.  Mississippi sustained only half as much damage as Louisiana from hurricane Katrina, but Congress mandated they share almost equally the initial $11.6 billion in CDBG funds for “citizen” long-term recovery (after several more months, Louisiana was successful in advocating for more).  Mississippi had a Republican governor and a strong Congressional delegation at the time, with one of its senators (Thad Cochran) chairing the Appropriations Committee.

(2) The nature of fundraising for emergencies is episodic.  Nonprofit responders like the American Red Cross reach out to private donors and the general public after each disaster.  States and the federal government also negotiate federal grants after each emergency.  As emergencies occur more frequently, the ability to rely upon the necessary level of funds through such methods becomes questionable.  It also makes very few resources available for disaster preparedness.

(3) FEMA has limited understanding and ability to coordinate the many local nonprofits that will provide  extremely important services in any major catastrophe (another GAO finding).  As the recent GAO report suggests, and as our Katrina experience demonstrated, a major event will outstrip the capacity of the national nonprofit responders. Local groups will fill the gaps, and since they have local trust and expertise, they can be extremely effective providers.  While FEMA assumed the responsibility to coordinate the efforts of these groups after squabbling about it with the American Red Cross during Katrina, the agency has little capacity to do so successfully.

(4) Local groups have very limited capacity and profile to access contributions by donors from outside the affected area.  The bulk of disaster donations go to large, high-profile national responders like the Salvation Army and the American Red Cross, while in a major catastrophe, local groups are often first on the scene.  During Katrina, for example, many local groups jumped in when they saw the need in their  communities, and they did so without worrying whether they had the funds for it.  But they don’t have the fund raising capacity to provide such services and make themselves known to a completely new public, and they often struggle to find the funds to pay for their courage.

Improvements since Katrina imply that we simply needed to enhance the efficiency and operations of the system already in place.  It’s a centralized approach that is built around a few institutions – FEMA, the American Red Cross, and the national VOAD agencies.  This works well for the size of most emergencies, but continues to crack when tasked at a large scale.  We seem to think that improving the system means building these institutions big enough and efficient enough to respond to anything.

I find this underlying assumption questionable.  I think we need to develop an approach that is decentralized and supple enough to integrate the strengths of hundreds of nonprofits if necessary.  I have some ideas for this that I’ll share in a following post.  I’d also appreciate comments from those of you who are experienced in providing disaster relief internationally.