In late April, Sherine Jayawickrama’s post Great Expectations, Rising Impatience: A Watershed Moment for U.S. Foreign Assistance posed several questions. Steve Feldstein responded to her question related to the evident imbalance among the 3Ds (defense, diplomacy and development).  This post provides a different perspective on the question.

I appreciate Steve Feldstein’s effort to combine principle and pragmatism in his comment on the 3 Ds; yet his bow to the political realism of Washington leaves me uneasy.

What does it mean for development to be “an indispensable partner” to defense and diplomacy?  Over the long term, I do believe that economic growth, equitable development, poverty reduction and effective governance everywhere is in the U.S. national interest. Human security throughout the world will advance our national security.

The problem is that so much of U.S. defense policy and diplomatic practice is driven by short-term considerations—conflicts and crises.  By its very nature, development (the empowerment of individuals, families, communities and nations to exercise an increasing measure of control over important decisions in their lives) demands a multi-decade perspective.  All too often, foreign aid that has been guided by or coupled with short-term political objectives has proven ineffective for development.

If defense and diplomacy are to be “partners” with development, they should be in a parallel partnership.  The advancement of development and reduction of poverty must become strategic objectives in their own right—not subservient to other diplomatic or security objectives.  Development is not about winning hearts and minds or about winning votes for our side in international forums.  It is about working with governments and people in impoverished countries, so that they can stand on their own two feet.

Peter D. Bell is a Senior Research Fellow at the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard University.

In late April, Sherine Jayawickrama’s post Great Expectations, Rising Impatience: A Watershed Moment for U.S. Foreign Assistance posed several questions. This post responds to her question related to the evident imbalance among the 3Ds (defense, diplomacy and development).  

I think there are several different ways to approach this issue.  On the one hand, it is accurate to say that despite the “3D – co-equal pillar” rhetoric between defense, diplomacy and development, the relative amount of resources, political attention and priority paid to each of the three areas remain vastly unequal. 

The numbers themselves are extremely telling – the President’s FY 2011 budget request for defense and national security spending totals approximately $733 billion.  In contrast, the FY 2011 budget request for the international affairs budget (funding both development and diplomatic programs) totals $55.8 billion. 

While resources and numbers are not the complete story – there is a basic truth to what an institution is able to accomplish with a $10 million program and a hundred million dollar intervention. That being said, it is equally important to consider larger trends and general levels of support for foreign aid today, versus 15 or 20 years ago.

The recent history of U.S. foreign assistance, especially after the Cold War, was not encouraging.  Foreign aid was decried as wasteful, unrelated to our national interests and faced wholesale cuts.  The Congress threatened to shutter the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) completely, and only a last minute deal that placed USAID under the control of the Secretary of State saved the agency. 

That did not prevent USAID from undergoing several staff rescissions, which decimated the talent, personnel and operational effectiveness of the agency.  Quite simply, the dialogue in the 1990s did not center around how to strengthen and elevate our development efforts.  Instead, it centered on a more basic question – should we undertake foreign aid programs at all, and is there any relation between development programs and U.S. foreign policy and national security interests.

Moving ahead to 2010, we find ourselves in a vastly different universe.  There is near unanimity in the policy community that development is an indispensable partner to our defense and diplomatic efforts.  There is little talk about scrapping our foreign aid programs.  Part of this shift in thinking is due to the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent recognition that failed states are direct threats to our national security, and that development assistance can be a key instrument in restoring governance to unstable areas, reducing terrorist safe havens, and preventing conflict from undermining fragile states. 

Thus, a key component to renewed support for development has been its nexus with U.S. diplomatic and defense priorities.  But this does not paint the whole story.  While national security imperatives have increased support for U.S. foreign aid, an equally significant driver has been increasing public awareness of humanitarian issues, greater involvement of faith-based groups in development programs, and broader American interest in international engagement. 

Several milestone programs, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), as well as a series of high profile U.S. humanitarian interventions (i.e., 2005 tsunami, Haiti earthquake relief) have resonated in profound ways with the American public.

And so we find ourselves in an interesting and complicated era, where real potential exists to increase U.S. engagement, resources and priority towards development issues, while recognizing that the funding disparity between development, diplomacy and defense will persist for years to come. 

If we view our development efforts simply as a subset of our national security efforts, then development will always remain subservient to our national security agenda.  Instead, if we look upon U.S. foreign aid as inhabiting several different roles – both as an essential partner towards achieving national security priorities, but separately as a critical agent for accomplishing humanitarian and developmental objectives – then we can continue to build a broad and sustainable base of support for future development programs and initiatives.

Steve Feldstein serves as a Professional Staff Member (majority staff) for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He shares these views in his personal capacity and is not speaking for the committee.

On April 21, a panel on Seizing Opportunities to Enhance U.S. Aid Effectiveness brought NGO and U.S. government perspectives together in a lively exchange (video below and blog post follows).  Professor Nicholas Burns, from the Harvard Kennedy School, moderated the panel.  Panelists were: Steve Feldstein, Professional Staff Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Congress; Paul O’Brien, Vice President of Policy and Advocacy, Oxfam America; Jonathan Quick, President and CEO, Management Sciences for Health; and Leon “Skip” Waskin, Senior Development Advisor, QDDR Leadership Team, U.S. State Department.

This is a watershed moment for articulating a clear vision for U.S. global development policy, revamping U.S. capacity to deliver effective foreign assistance and modernizing nearly 50-year-old legislation governing U.S. foreign assistance.  The Obama Administration’s commitment to elevating global development as a foreign policy priority set exceedingly high expectations, especially among the NGO community. 

However, with the QDDR process mired in delays, the PSD unlikely to become public and the aid reform process stalled until the PSD and QDDR processes set a clear direction, a sense of impatience is rising.  If the Obama Administration waits much longer to communicate a clear vision and goal for U.S. engagement in global development, it risks losing the momentum and credibility to oversee a long-awaited process of reform.

The questions that must be confronted are not easy.  The current system is fragmented and its coherence is weak.  Despite broad agreement on the need for reform and the basic directions for change, there are vested interests in government (and among NGOs and private contractors) that tend toward the status quo.  For example, legislators want to be able to claim the credit for certain budgetary earmarks (and maintain oversight re these earmarks) as much as NGOs desire earmarks for “their” sectors or issues.  The need for a “grand bargain” is clear.

Some of the questions to be confronted are:

• Despite the rhetoric of the 3Ds (defense, diplomacy and development) being “co-equal” pillars, there is a clear hierarchy that is reflected in how power and resources are distributed.  Defense imperatives cast a clear security frame for both diplomatic and developmental efforts. Furthermore, embedding USAID in the State Department – together with the weakening of USAID’s staffing and resources over the years – leaves development the lesser partner in this triad. Will this mean that development will be seen as a tool for advancing the national security agenda?  What would that imply?
• There is a pressing need for clear goals and strategy to guide U.S. engagement in global development.  Historically, the U.S. government has pursued many (sometimes contradictory) goals and has not been good at prioritizing and limiting its efforts.  What should these goals be?  What principles should guide U.S. efforts?  What capacities, resources and orientation would be needed to meet these goals effectively?
• Elevating development and increasing the coherence of U.S. foreign assistance requires a solution to the proliferation of agencies involved in administering foreign assistance (e.g. PEPFAR, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Defense). However, the Obama Administration itself might be contributing to this proliferation with the creation of initiatives for global health and food security. How will a coordinated whole-of-government strategy be articulated and advanced, while attending to the urgent need to rebuild and revitalize USAID?
• An increasing amount of evidence – and international agreements like the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – point to the need for countries and communities to have ownership of their development processes. How should U.S. global development policy and foreign assistance strategy affirm the principle of country ownership?  What funding mechanisms (e.g. budget support) should be explored, and what performance conditions might be attached to ensure some accountability?
• Dramatic changes to the U.S. approach to global development and foreign assistance must be supported by the American public.  What is being done to build understanding of this issue and build support for more effective approaches?  What is the rationale for maintaining the PSD as an internal document, when transparency re its content could be so helpful in building such awareness and support?  Even within the government, would a more open process lay the groundwork for more transformational reform?

The April 21 panel wrestled with these questions and more.  There’s a lot of great fodder for discussion here, especially as we anticipate the release of the interim QDDR and await word of the PSD process.  Reactions and perspectives – either as comments on this blog or as guest posts – are most welcome.  Do write in!

Sherine Jayawickrama manages the Humanitarian & Development NGOs domain of practice at the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard University.